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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal, pursuant to U.C.A. § 78A-4-
103(j)(2009), as an appeal from a grant of Summary Judgment by the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, West Jordan Department, State of Utah, entered on October 28, 
2010. The appeal was filed on November 17, 2010. This appeal was "poured-over" to the 
Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78A-3-102(4)(2009). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1) Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to Gardner 
(apartment owner) because he owed no duty of care to a trespasser, Jensen 
(prospective tenant)? 
2) Did the trial court, alternatively, err in holding that Gardner owed no duty 
of care to Jensen, because the dangerous condition was "open and obvious"? 
Gardner's motion was made pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56, raising a question of law, calling 
for review is de novo, for which no deference is given to the trial court's conclusions. See 
See Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 61, 221 P.3d 219 (Utah 2009). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The determinative authorities in this case are: 
Restatement of Torts, 2d, §332 "Invitee Defined": 
(1) An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor 
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a 
1 
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member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the 
public. 
(3) A business visitor is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for 
a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the 
possessor of the land. 
Restatement of Torts, 2d, §343 "Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by 
Possessor": 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his 
invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the 
condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to 
such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or 
will fail to protect themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. 
Restatement of Torts, 2d, §343 A "Known or Obvious Dangers": 
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused to 
them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or 
obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such 
knowledge or obviousness. 
(2) In determining whether the possessor should anticipate the harm from a 
known or obvious danger, the fact that the invitee is entitled to make use of 
public land, or of the facilities of a public utility, is a factor of importance 
indicating that the harm should be anticipated. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
Jensen filed this action against Gardner, alleging negligence in placing a sidewalk 
under an overhanging balcony. Jensen alleged that this negligence caused her injury, 
consisting primarily of a broken leg. 
2 
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2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
Gardner moved for summary judgment arguing that Jensen was a trespasser, or, 
alternatively, that he owed no duty to Jensen. The trial court granted summary judgment by 
minute entry of October 18, 2010, and order entered on October 28, 2010. Jensen appealed 
on November 17,2010, and her appeal was "poured-over" to this Court by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
3. Statement of Relevant Facts on Appeal 
Gardner has owned an apartment complex at about 7964 South Main Street, in 
Midvale, Utah for over thirty (30) years. (R. 104). On October 16, 2006, Jensen visited the 
complex to look at an apartment, accompanied by her friend. (Id.) Upon arriving at the 
complex, Jensen drove down the complex's driveway and parked in the tenant parking lot 
behind the building. (Id.) The driveway leading back to the tenant parking lot is private and 
has two clearly visible signs stating "Tenant Parking Only" and "No Trespassing". (R. 105). 
Neither Alan nor Dorothy Gardner gave Jensen permission to use the private driveway or 
park in the private tenant parking lot, and they did not know she had parked there. (Id.) Alan 
Gardner does not recall ever telling a prospective tenant to park in the tenant parking lot, and 
instead tells them to park elsewhere. (Id.) Kathy Gardner was inside one of the apartment 
units when Jensen arrived and did not know they had parked in the private tenant parking lot. 
(Id.) Prospective tenants almost never park in the complex' tenant parking lot. (Id.) From the 
3 
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parking lot, Jensen walked down the complex' driveway to the front of the complex, and met 
Dorothy Gardner inside. (Id.) A balcony for one of the apartments extends approximately 
three feet seven inches (3f 7") out from the driveway side of the building and is about five 
feet two inches (51 2") off the ground. While Jensen was inside the complex viewing the 
apartment it began to rain outside. (R. 106). When Jensen left the apartment, she did not see 
which way Jensen went. (Id.) When Jensen left the apartment, she lowered her head and ran 
toward her car because of the rain. (Id.) Jensen was not watching where she was going while 
running toward her car and hit her head on the balcony. (Id.) When Jensen fell, she broke her 
leg. (R. 107). No one other than Jensen has hit their head on the balcony or been injured by 
it. (Id.) Neither Kathy nor Alan Gardner had any reason to know that Jensen would walk by 
the balcony. (Id.) Neither Alan nor Kathy Gardner expected, or had reason to expect, that 
Jensen parked in the apartment Complex' parking lot, or that she would run along the 
complex' private driveway adjacent to the building to get to her car. (Id.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Jensen was a "business visitor", because she was on Gardner's apartment grounds to 
discuss potentially renting an apartment. The overhanging balcony over a paved sidewalk 
was a condition undisputedly known to Gardner. A jury could find that the balcony and 
sidewalk placement created "an unreasonable risk of harm" to Jensen, which he should have 
anticipated "despite such . . . obviousness". 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
JENSEN WAS AN "INVITEE" WHILE ENTERING THE APARTMENT 
PROPERTY AS A PROSPECTIVE TENANT 
At the time of her accident, Jensen was inquiring about the possibility of renting one 
of Gardner's apartments. Gardner argued to the trial court that Jensen was a "trespasser", 
rather than an "invitee". The trial court dismissed Jensen's claim "on all the grounds set forth 
in the Memorandum in support of [Gardner's] Motion for Summary Judgment...".1 Gardner 
did not suggest that he is opposed to people coming on his premises to rent his apartments. 
Gardner also argues that although some potential tenants use the tenant parking, most don't. 
Gardner's logical leap is that all of those people who have used their tenant parking as 
potential tenants are guilty of trespass. 
A. Jensen Had Express Invitation to be on the Premises. 
By holding out his apartments for rent, Gardner gave express invitation for potential 
tenants to stop and inquire on the premises. Further, after Jensen arrived at the apartments, 
Gardner's wife showed her the apartment for rent. Crardner's agent, his wife, expressly 
consented to Jensen's presence, at least for purposes of showing her the apartment. If that did 
Actually, the trial court's minute entry of October 18, 2010, states "whether she was a 
trespasser or a business invitee, for the purposes of Motion, it does not matter." Gardner's 
counsel, however, prepared an Order broader than the minute entry. 
5 
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not make Jensen's status as an invitee abundantly clear, it would, at the very least be a 
question of fact for a jury. Jensen did not "exceed the consent given . . . " for examining the 
apartment for rent. By showing an apartment to Jensen for possible future rental, Gardner 
gave express consent to Jensen, rendering her an invitee. 
R The Act of Renting Apartments Extends an Implied Invitation to Prospective Tenants. 
Certainly, Jensen is within a category of persons whom Gardner hopes will come onto 
his premises to rent the property, as a potential tenant. By signing their property "Tenant 
Parking Only", Gardner implicitly solicited potential tenants as well. 
The conduct of Gardner's wife, in showing Jensen the apartment for rent, could also 
be viewed as an implied invitation and consent to her presence. At no time did Gardner 
object to Jensen being there, or ask her to leave. While Jensen does not believe there is any 
doubt that she had at least implied consent to be there, it raised a jury question at a minimum. 
C. Jensen Was An Invitee Under the Restatement of Torts, 2d §332. 
The Restatement of Torts, 2d, §332 categorizes "Invitee" into two subcategories: 
"public invitee" and "business visitor". Section 332 includes, under the "business visitor" 
category, persons with potential future business dealings with the possessor as well as those 
with actual or present business dealings: 
It is not necessary that the visitor's purpose be to enter into immediate business 
dealings with the possessor. The benefit to the possessor may be indirect and 
in the future. . . . It is not necessary that the particular visit shall offer the 
possibility of business dealings, or of benefit to the possessor. It is enough that 
6 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it has a reasonable connection with another visit which does. 
Id., comment f. Jensen clearly visited with a future business dealing in mind, making her a 
"business visitor" under Section 332. 
Other jurisdictions have agreed that a prospective renter is a business invitee. 
Oettinger v. Stewart, 24 Cal.2d 133 (Cal. 1944) directly addressed this situation. Oettinger 
stopped at an apartment building in Santa Monica, and inquired about an apartment with the 
landlord's wife, who lived on the premises. Oettinger was injured, and the California 
Supreme Court held that: 
It is clear that in this case plaintiff was a business visitor, and there was 
no evidence from which the jury could have found that plaintiff was a 
trespasser or a licensee. An invitation or permission to enter upon land need 
not be express but may be implied from such circumstances as the conduct of 
the possessor, the arrangement of the premises, or local custom. (See Tschumy 
v. Brook's Market, 60 Cal.App.2d 158, 165 ; Rest., Torts, sections 330-332, 
Comment.) Here the building was obviously an apartment house. On the 
outside was a sign reading "York House," and in the hall was another sign 
bearing the word "office." Plaintiff came upon the premises as a prospective 
tenant—a purpose connected with the business conducted thereon, and she, 
therefore, was a business visitor. (See 38 Am. Jur. 754, 783, 784; 45 C.J. 
808-812.) 
Id., at 136-7 (emphasis added). Accord, Hall v. Glick, 111 Pa.Super. 546, 110 A.2d 836 
(Pa.Super 1955)(prospective tenant is business invitee); Eggen v. Hickman, 21A Ky. 550,119 
S.W.2d633 (Ky.App. 1938)(prospective renter is invitee); compare Allstate Ins. Co. v. U.S. 
Associates Realty, Inc., 11 Ohio App.3d 242, 464 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 
1983)(prospective home purchaser is invitee); Kalus v. Bass, 122 Md. 467, 89 A. 731 (Md. 
7 
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1914)(son of prospective tenant is invitee). 
POINT TWO 
GARDNER OWED JENSEN A DUTY TO EXERCISE REASONABLE 
CARE AS A BUSINESS INVITEE 
Gardner owed a duty of reasonable care to business invitees, such as Jensen, on his 
premises.2 Utah has clear precedent on this question. In Hale v. Beckstead, 116 P.3d 263, 
266; 2005 UT 24, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Restatement of Torts, 2d that address 
this situation: 
Section 343, "Dangerous Conditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor": 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by 
a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable 
care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable 
risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or 
realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise 
reasonable care to protect them against the danger. 
There was a genuine issue of material fact whether Jensen met each of these requirements. 
A. Gardner Knew of the Condition of the Sidewalk. 
Section 343 creates a duty of care toward invitees, such as Jensen, regarding 
conditions that Gardner "knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover 
2The trial court simplistically stated only "Plaintiff struck her head because it was raining, 
she was running, and looking down at her fee [sic]. Plaintiff was not looking where she was 
going". Minute entry, October 18, 2010. This statement of factual causation masks the correct 
issues of duty, not causation. It also omits consideration of breach of duty, not raised by Gardner. 
8 
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Gardner does not suggest that it was unaware of the "condition on the land", i.e., the 
overhang over the sidewalk. This was a permanent condition of the apartment. Given the fact 
that Gardner had owned the property for years, he can hardly suggest that he had not had time 
to inspect the property and discover this condition. 
R Gardner Should Have Realized The Balcony Overhang Created an Unreasonable Risk 
of Harm to Invitees. 
A jury could find that the overhanging balcony created an "unreasonable risk of 
harm". The overhang was five (5) feet two (2) inches above the sidewalk. The average adult 
female in the United States of America is five (5) feet four (4) inches tall. The average adult 
female would just catch the top of her head on the overhanging balcony. If the balcony were 
significantly lower, it would be less of a hazard, because it would be more directly in front 
of a pedestrian. On the other hand, if it were slightly higher, it would be less of a hazard, 
because most women would pass under it. Unfortunately for Jensen, the "Goldilocks" 
balcony was exactly the right height to be less visible, and more of a hazard. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently considered whether an overhead hazard could 
constitute an "unreasonable risk" of injury. In an FELA case, Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009 UT 
61, 221 P.3d 219 (Utah 2009), the Court held that an overhead air conditioning unit in a 
railroad locomotive passageway created an "unnecessary danger of personal injury" despite 
being located 5fl 1" off the floor. Id., at TJ45-52. If an overhanging air conditioning unit at 
5f 11" may pose an "unreasonable danger of personal injury", then an overhanging balcony 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at 5f2" may pose an "unreasonable risk of harm." 
C. Gardner Should Have Expected that Invitees Might Fail to Protect Themselves 
Against The Overhang. 
Gardner argues that the "open and obvious" nature of the overhang meant that he 
should not anticipate that any invitees "might fail to protect themselves" from it. But Raab 
shows otherwise. Another similar case is Hale v. Beckstead, supra, where a painter fell off 
an unguarded balcony in a moment of forgetfulness or distraction. Hale cited favorably a 
comment to Section 343 which recognizes that: 
Where an "invitee's attention may be distracted, such that he will not discover 
what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect 
himself against it," a possessor of land may be liable for breaching his duty of 
care if he fails "to warn ... or to take other reasonable steps to protect [the 
invitee]." 
Id., Comment f on Subsection (1). 
In Jensen's case, the rain falling down caused her to shield her face against it by 
dropping her gaze downward. This is the most natural and normal reaction to walking in the 
rain. Rain is a foreseeable and inevitable occurrence in Utah, and a pedestrian who turns her 
face downward against the force of a storm is also foreseeable and inevitable. That 
foreseeable inattention is what creates the duty on the possessor to take reasonable steps to 
protect his invitee. Ward v. K Mart Corp,, 136 I11.2d 132, 554 N.E.2d 223 (111. 
1990)(foreseeable that customer carrying mirror might not see pole immediately outside exit 
door due to momentary distraction). 
10 
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Gardner makes much of his subjective lack of expectation that Jensen might run to her 
car in the rain, with her head down, and hit her head. He emphasizes how he did not 
specifically know that Jensen was parked in the back in tenant parking, and that he did not 
specifically know or expect that she would walk under the balcony. This emphasis on 
Gardner's subjective lack of expectation is misplaced. The inquiry is whether an objectively 
reasonable person would have expected that a pedestrian, for whatever reason, would be 
momentarily distracted from the overhanging balcony, and walk into it, striking their head. 
Regarding the objectively reasonable man standard, see e.g. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 111 
P.2d 1053,1060 (Utah 1989)(quoting Restatement of Torts, 2d, §283B defining standard of 
care of defendant as "reasonable man" under like circumstances); Cleggv. Wasatch County, 
2010 UT 5,1J22; 227 P.3d 1243, 1248 (Utah 2010)(subjective failure to see officer's lights 
and siren "not material"; issue of fact whether they were "reasonably" visible). 
The New Jersey Supreme Court eloquently answered Gardner's assertions in a 
landowner/social guest negligence case: 
The Restatement was revised to impose liability on the land possessor if he 
11
 has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an 
unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees [social guests]." Id. at § 342(a) 
(emphasis added). The landowner is not the measure of whether a known 
condition of the property is dangerous. The inquiry is an objective one, 
whether the landowner should realize the condition posed an unreasonable 
risk of harm. Taneian v. Meghrigian, 15 N.J. 267, 277, 104 A.2d 689 (1954) (" 
?If an occupier actually knows of a state of affairs on his land which a reasonable 
man would realize was a danger, he should not be allowed to escape from his 
responsibilities on the plea that he was not a reasonable man and did not realize 
11 
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it.?") (quoting Hawkins v. Coulsdon & Purley Urban Dist. Council, 2 W.L.R. 122 
(1954)). 
Parks v. Rogers, 176 NJ. 491; 825 A.2d 1128,1132-1133 (N.J. 2003)(emphasis added). The 
question is not whether Gardner subjectively realized that the overhanging balcony was 
hazardous, or that someone like Jensen might encounter it in a moment of inattentiveness, 
it is whether a reasonable man in his situation would have. That is a jury question. 
D. The Overhanging Balcony was Unreasonably Dangerous Even Though It Was "Open 
and Obvious". 
The trial court seemed to feel that because the hazard was "open and obvious", Jensen 
was automatically completely at fault. This analysis is off-target. A landowner may have a 
duty to exercise reasonable care to warn or remediate a hazard, even if it is "open and 
obvious": 
(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for 
physical harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the 
land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the 
possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or 
obviousness. 
Restatement of Torts, 2d, § 343 A "Known or Obvious Dangers". The fact that Jensen was 
there to do business with Gardner, to his financial benefit, is a "factor of importance 
indicating that the harm should be anticipated". Not only was Jensen's presence there as an 
invitee expected, Gardner's whole purpose was to make her, like the others, a permanent 
resident of the premises. Permanently installing invitees on one's property should call for a 
12 
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duty to anticipate harms such as this, even from an "open and obvious" danger. An overhang 
five (5) feet two (2) inches off the ground, just lower than the average adult female, directly 
over a paved sidewalk, leading from an apartment where invitees live, is a hazard which 
requires special notice or caution. 
Gardner makes much of the fact that Jensen was a "prospective" rather than an 
"actual" tenant, seeming to argue that, while he should have anticipated injury to an actual 
tenant, the fact that he did not specifically anticipate that a prospective tenant would use the 
sidewalk dispenses with any duty. Utah law does not draw such fine distinctions. A landlord 
has a duty of care toward both tenants and guests, which a landlord would not ordinarily be 
in a position to specifically foresee. Schofieldv. Kinzell, 29 Utah 2d 427, 511 P.2d 149 (Utah 
1973)(landlord has duty to guest of tenant regarding snow and ice on premises). It is not the 
specific identity of the pedestrian or her specific purpose that matters; only that it is 
foreseeable that someone using the sidewalk as an invitee, on a rainy day, might cast her gaze 
downward and not see the overhanging balcony while hurrying to the dry safety of her car. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred by concluding that Jensen was a trespasser. As a potential renter 
of Gardner's apartment, she was a "business visitor" under Restatement of Torts, 2d, §332. 
Under Section 343, Gardner knew of the condition as the owner of the apartment. He knew 
or should have known that an overhang such as this created "an unreasonable risk of harm", 
13 
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which he should expect a pedestrian "will fail to protect [herself] against. . .". Pursuant to 
Section 343A, the fact that the hazard was "open and obvious" does not bar Jensen's suit, 
because Gardner "should anticipate the harm [to Jensen] despite such... obviousness." .The 
trial court's summary judgment of the case should be reversed. 
DATED this 18th day of July, 2011. 
BERTCH ROBSON ATTORNEYS 
©anielF. Bertch 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant Jensen 
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